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Islamic Attitudes and the Support for 
Gender Equality and Democracy in 
Seven Arab Countries, and the Role 
of Anti-Western Feelings  
 
Niels Spierings 
London School of Economics and Political Science  
Abstract 
In the societal and scientific discussions about the support for democracy and gender 
equality in the Arab Middle East, this study engages the triangular theory, which 
links Islamic orientations, gender equality attitudes and democracy. I theorize and 
test if and how Islam is related to the attitudes towards democracy and gender 
equality, and whether gender equality attitudes partly channel the influence of Islam 
on democracy support. The different theoretical expectations were tested on Arab 
Barometer data for seven countries, including three different dimensions of Islamic-
religious identity: affiliation, piety, and political-Islamist attitudes. The analyses 
roughly back the triangular model, but for democratic support only the Islamist 
values seem important, partly working through economic gender equality attitudes. 
Attitudes towards women’s position in politics and education seem unrelated to 
democratic support. In addition, this study applies the gender and postcolonial 
concept of ‘othering’ to the triangular model. Theoretically it predicts that in the 
current neo-colonial era, anti-Western feelings might create more Islamic and less 
democracy and gender equal attitudes simultaneously, making Islam’s impact partly 
spurious. Empirically, this is modestly supported for the Islamist-democracy link 
only. However, anti-Western feelings do relate to gender equality, democratic 
support, and religious attitudes, and deserves more attention when studying 
democracy and gender equality in the Arab Middle East. 
Keywords: Islam, gender equality, attitudes in the Middle East, neo-colonialism 
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Las Actitudes Islámicas y el Apoyo a la 
Igualdad de Género y la Democracia en 
Siete Países Árabes, y el Papel de los 
Sentimientos Anti-Occidentales 
Niels Spierings 
London School of Economics and Political Science  
Abstract 
En los debates sociales y científicos sobre el apoyo a la democracia y la igualdad de 
género en el Medio Oriente árabe, este estudio enlaza la teoría triangular, que une 
orientaciones islámicas, las actitudes de igualdad de género y la democracia. El 
punto de partida y análisis es cómo el Islam está relacionado con las actitudes hacia 
la democracia y la igualdad de género, y si las actitudes de igualdad de género 
canalizan en parte la influencia del Islam en el apoyo a la democracia. Las diferentes 
expectativas teóricas fueron probadas a través de los datos del Barómetros árabes de 
siete países, entre ellos tres dimensiones diferentes de la identidad islámica 
religiosa: afiliación, la piedad y las actitudes político-islamistas. Los análisis refutan 
más o menos el modelo triangular, pero respecto al apoyo democrático sólo los 
valores islámicos parecen importantes, en parte por el trabajo a través de actitudes 
de igualdad de género económicas. Las actitudes hacia la posición de la mujer en la 
política y la educación parecen no tener relación con el apoyo democrático. En este 
estudio se aplica el concepto de género y postcolonial de "otredad" con el modelo 
triangular. En teoría predice que en la era neo-colonial actual, los sentimientos anti-
occidentales podrían crear más actitudes islámicas y menos democráticas y de 
igualdad género, por lo que el impacto del Islam en parte equívoco. Empíricamente, 
esto es apoyado de manera moderada sólo por el enlace entre islam-democracia. Sin 
embargo, los sentimientos anti-occidentales están relacionados con la igualdad de 
género, el apoyo democrático, y las actitudes religiosas, y merece más atención en el 
estudio de la democracia y la igualdad de género en el Medio Oriente árabe. 
Keywords: Islam, igualdad de géero, actitudes en el Este Medio, neo-colonialismo 
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ince 9/11 the debate about the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy and gender equality has reinvigorated. Not for the least 
because bringing democracy and protecting women was often part 
of the legitimization of the Western neo-colonial military operations in for 
instance Afghanistan and Iraq; international politics that tended to ignore the 
local movements fighting for democracy and women’s rights, which in some 
cases all of a sudden faced severe accusations of being allies of the foreign 
invaders. Academically, the international situation drew attention to 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations‘-thesis (1993; 1996) again, which 
argues that a Western and Islamic civilization exist that differ fundamentally 
on democratic and gender equality values (see also Inglehart & Norris, 
2003a). In the wake of that argument, and despite of Islamic-theological 
arguments that actually ground democracy and gender equality in the Qu’ran 
and Hadith (e.g. Abou El-Fadl 2004; Ahmed, 1992; Esposito & Voll 1996; 
Selim, 2003) or significant Islamic and Muslim feminist movements 
(Ghorashi, 1996; Moghadam, 2003b:Ch8; Doumato & Posusney, 2003:8-
11), and local organisations fighting for democracy (e.g. RAWA in 
Afghanistan, LSTDO in Lebanon, Al Bawsal in Tunisia) scholars have 
concluded that Islam prevents these values from developing, which is 
generally assumed to be related to Islam being a traditional religion, not 
separating between ‘church’ and state, and having a violent nature (see 
Angrist, 2012; Fish, 2002). Additionally, the lack of gender equality has 
been argued to be one of the reasons why there is little democracy in the 
Middle East, as gender equality harbours values fundamental to democracy 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003a) and gender hierarchy feeds an authoritarian 
culture (Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002). In this study, I identify three 
major empirical and theoretical shortcomings in this literature on the general 
relationships, which need further study, as will provided here.  
 First of all, on average, after taking socio-economic, political and 
historical factors into account, Muslim countries might be less gender equal 
and less democratic (Barro, 1999; Fish, 2002; Ross 2001), but have these 
elite- of country-level differences a foundation in popular opinion? For only 
a few countries, this triangular relationship is studied – (e.g. Kuwait [Rizzo, 
Meyer & Ali, 2002]; Saudi Arabia [Moaddel, 2006]), and studies including 
multiple countries leave out parts of the triangle, such as the role of Islam 
S 
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(Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007). Consequently, we do not know to what 
extent ‘more Islamic people’ in the Middle East are on average less in favour 
of gender equality and (consequently) less supportive of democracy. Here, I 
will study these relationships using Arab Barometer data for seven Arab 
countries in the Middle East: Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Yemen. All data are collected in 2006 or later, but before the 
‘Arab Spring’ took place.  
 Second, Islam is often treated as a simple dichotomous concept: a 
country or person is either Islamic/Muslim or not. Based on that 
classification, far-reaching conclusions on women’s position or democracy 
are drawn (Barro, 1999; Fish, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a; 2003b; 
Lincove, 2008; Ross, 2001). Clearly, people’s religious identity is more 
complex than that. This is recognized in some of the attitudinal studies, but 
each uses different aspects and measurements of religiosity, orthodoxy and 
Islamism, which makes it difficult to compare the results (see Hofman, 
2004; Meyer, Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; Tessler & Gao, 2005). In 
this study, I will distinguish between affiliation, religiosity or piety, and 
political Islam or Islamism. The general influence on democracy and gender 
equality of each is theorized and tested. This enables me to draw more 
precise conclusions about the impact of Islamic-religious identities.  
 Third, the linkages between Islam, gender equality and democracy are 
often discussed as if they are exogenous to the international political context, 
and in the study of mass support for gender equality and democracy, the 
resistance to the Western penetration of Arab societies has not been 
considered as force that might create religious, democratic and gender 
attitudes. However, Angrist (2012) shows that the resistance against Western 
cultural imperialism partly explains the difference between Arab Muslim 
countries and non-Arab Muslim countries in terms women’s position. In the 
last part of this study, I will draw from post-colonial and gender theory, 
more specifically the process of ‘othering’ (see De Beauvoir, 1978; Said, 
1978; Scharff, 2011), to critically review the relationship between more 
conservative Islamic beliefs (which are evidently not hold by all Muslim 
people in these countries), support for democracy, and gender equality, by 
taking into account anti-Western attitudes. I suggest that a stronger and more 
conservative Islamic-religious identity is a product of ‘othering’ and the anti-
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Western sentiments and that Islam’s influence on gender equality and 
democracy might be partly spurious. Subsequently, I will introduce anti-
Western feelings to the analyses and assess how they are related to religion, 
gender equality and democratic support. While these analyses are 
explorative and provide little information about causal directions - Islamic 
orientations might also lead to anti-Western feelings – they provide an 
important first step in this unexplored area. 
 
Literature & Theoretical Background 
 
Islam, Democracy and Gender Equality  
 
In society and the social sciences, Islam can hardly be discussed without 
making references to democracy or gender equality it seems, and then Islam 
is often seen as the (potential) cause of low levels of democracy and gender 
equality. Thereby several authors suggest that an average lack in gender 
equality might actually be the link between Islam and authoritarianism (e.g. 
Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a). This 
theoretical triangle is depicted in the conclusion of Donno & Russett (2004) 
– reproduced here as Figure 1 – and it sums up the current state of the 
literature rather well. 
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Figure 1 
 
The triangle Islam-Democracy-Gender Equality (produced from Donno & 
Russett (2004, p. 601) 
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 In much (quantitative) research of the influence of Islam on democracy as 
well as gender equality, the theoretical explanations are rather thin and fall 
back to culturalist arguments, such as (a) “divergent values … between the 
West and Islam” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a: 68-9, 73); (b) “obstacles to 
female participation include religion … Religious norms … discourage … 
participation most strongly in Islamic countries” (Lincove, 2008: 50, 57); (c) 
that Muslim countries’ electoral gap is possibly due to “the strong linkage 
between church and state (Barro, 1999: S177; emphasis added); or (d) 
“Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, 
equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free market, the separation of 
church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, 
Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.” (Huntington, 1993: 40). Overall, the 
culturalist arguments stress that in Islam the collective takes precedence over 
the individual; that Islam rules over the private and public sphere; that Islam 
is illiberal and resolves conflicts with violence; and that it is fatalist.  
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 These arguments ignore that actors in the Middle East also use scriptures 
(Qu’ran) and practices (Hadith) to argue in favour of democracy and gender 
equality. Regarding democracy it has been argued that (a) the prophet did 
not appoint a successor deliberately so that one had to be chosen; (b) the 
Islamic concept ijthihad is said to lay the foundation for democracy as it tells 
people to form their own judgement; and (c) the appliance of shura shows 
that Muhammad favoured democracy, as he used this consultation in 
decision-making processes (Abou El Fadl, 2004; Esposito & Voll, 1996; 
Rizzo, Meyer & Ali, 2002). Similarly, Islamic feminist see Islam as a source 
of empowerment. An often-used example is that women only inheriting half 
of men according to shari’a interpretations, but feminist have contexualized 
this historically and show that this was a major step forwards at that time, 
putting Islam at the forefront of women’s emancipation (e.g. Selim, 2003). 
This is not only a historical facts, but also today many organisation in the 
Middle East fight for women’s rights and democracy, sometimes risking 
their own safety. Some examples include the in the introduction mentioned 
RAWA (Afghanistian), LSTDO (Lebanon), Al Bawsal (Tunisia), as well as 
documentaries on women by for instance Nuria Andreu (Morocco) (Andreu, 
2013) or Aliaa Maghda al-Mahdy’s ‘A Rebel Diary’ blog with nude protest 
pictures (2013, Egypt) and the following ‘Nude Photos Revolutionaries 
Calendar’ Facebook page, which is still in the air.  
 Nevertheless, the overall and summarizing empirical results are rather 
robust and show that relatively many of the Muslim-majority countries are 
more often dictatorial and on average implement discriminating laws against 
women more regularly, in particular in the Middle East. This relationship is 
rather robust even after taking into account differences in economic 
development, oil, urbanization, income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, 
British and Soviet domination, and educational levels (e.g. Barro, 1999; 
Fish, 2002; Ross, 2001). A seemingly crucial mechanism in culturalist 
explanations of this relationship are not just the theological arguments 
discussed above, but also the fact that the majority of the people are 
expected to hold a stance towards democracy and gender equality that is in 
line with the rather traditional or conservative interpretation of Islam.  
Of course, the political system and (gender) policies in a country might 
not always reflect the mass’ opinion (see also Badran, 2001; Donno & 
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Russett, 2004; Spierings, 2011), but that the income out the oil industry is 
used by authoritarian elites to suppress the people’s wishes (providing 
welfare or using violence) (Ross, 2001, 2008) shows these elites conceive 
the people potentially powerful. The uprisings during the Arab Spring have 
further substantiated this idea. As such popular demand seems an important 
if not necessary (but not sufficient) ingredient for governments and elites in 
Arab countries to change their policies fundamentally. 
 
Islamic Attitudes and Popular Support for Gender Equality and 
Democracy  
 
After individual-level data on the Arab public’s attitudes became available, 
scholars started to address the question whether there is a general 
relationship between Islam and the other corners of the triangle, often 
relying theoretically on the culturalist arguments discussed above. 
 A handful of these studies focus on attitudes towards gender equality and 
women’s rights, and most point into the one and the same direction: stronger 
Islamic-religious orientations are on average associated with less support for 
gender equality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b; Moaddel, 2006; Norris & 
Inglehart, 2012; Rizzo, Meyer & Ali, 2002). While these studies share their 
conclusion, they approach the issue rather differently. Inglehart and Norris’ 
cross-country studies show that on average the people in Muslim countries 
and Muslim people support gender equality and sexual liberty less than 
people in Western countries and non-Muslims (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 
2003b; Norris, 2009; Norris & Inglehart, 2012). Moaddel (2006) and Rizzo, 
Meyer & Ali (2002) present country studies for respectively Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait that include more refined measures of Islam. Rizzo, Meyer & 
Ali find that both Shia and Sunni people who have more Islamic-orthodox 
beliefs have on average less positive attitudes towards women’s political 
participation, but people who identify themselves as Muslim are generally 
somewhat more supportive of it. Moaddel finds that more religious people 
and people that identify themselves as being religious support polygamy and 
women’s obedience more on average. However, mosque participation and 
daily prayer do not show such correlation – mosque participation even 
correlates negatively with support for obedience. Also, people who describe 
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themselves as Muslim are generally more in favour of polygamy and more 
religious in terms of prayers. Summarized, on average people with a Muslim 
affiliation and higher levels of religiosity seem to be less favourable towards 
different aspects of gender equality,1 but affiliation seems less relevant once 
religiosity is taken into account. This might indicate that Islam is not much 
different from other religions in terms of the message it conveys, but that on 
average Muslim people are currently more religious than people from other 
religions.  
 The literature on Arab people’s support of democracy and the impact of 
Islamic orientations is more abundant. Without exception these studies show 
that Arab people do think that democracy is a desirable form of government 
(Hofman, 2004; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Meyer, 
Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007; 
Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005). The impact of Islam is less clear. 
Empirically, different elements labelled as ‘religiosity’ are found to relate to 
democratic attitudes negatively (Meyer, Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Tessler, 2002), but in a few other studies no 
relationship is found (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Tessler, 2002), and Rizzo, 
Abdel-Latif & Meyer (2007) even find a positive relationship in the five 
Arab countries they study. Of the studies that focus more on the type or 
depth of Islamic beliefs, surprisingly, most find no relationship between 
orthodoxy or Islamism and democratic support (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; 
Meyer, Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005). Moaddel 
(2006) is an exception and shows that people who desire Shari’a law 
generally support democracy less, even though emancipatory and democratic 
interpretations of Shari’a law exist. In most cases, negative relationships 
with Islam are explained by the culturalist argument about Islam’s 
conservativeness. Surprisingly or noteworthy, (unexpected) positive 
relations between Islam and democratic support are generally not explained 
by the alternative interpretations of Islam as discussed above, but in terms of 
instrumentalism, whereby democracy is way to power for Islamist (e.g. 
Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007).  
 Two studies also treat people’s attitudes on gender equality as a link 
between religious orientations and support for electoral democracy. 
According to Inglehart & Norris (2003a) gender equality and sexual liberal 
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values are the best indicators of democratic tolerance – a ‘litmus test’ -, but 
they do not study whether there is an indirect effect of Islam on democratic 
support. Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer (2007) do include being religious and 
supporting gender equality in their explanatory model of democratic support 
and they find, surprisingly, that people with stronger gender equality views 
were less supportive of democracy in their five Arab countries. They also 
use an instrumentalist explanation: people who want gender equality might 
fear democracy empowers Islamists (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007: 
1165). However, they do not link gender equality to both religiosity and 
democratic support.  
 Summarizing, it is still rather unclear which aspects of an Islamic-
religious identity influences support for gender equality and democracy in 
the Arab Middle East, and what the general relationship between gender 
equality and democracy is. In this study, that triangular relationship will be 
tested for seven Arab countries. In line with sociological distinctions in 
religious attitudes, I distinguish between religious affiliation, religious piety, 
and political Islam (see Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham & Pitcher, 1986; 
Fleischman, 2011). This enables me to formulate more precise expectations 
and provide more rigorous tests. I do not expect a strong impact of affiliation 
once controlled for the other Islamic aspects, since the different strands of a 
religion collapsed in affiliation are often highly divers. Religious piety - the 
strength and degree of conservativeness of one’s religious views - is 
expected to be related to gender equality negatively, but less so (directly) to 
democratic support, since gender equality is more strongly connected to 
ideas of modernization and less accepted universally. Political Islamism is 
expected to limit peoples’ support for democracy, because it entails the 
prioritization of Islamic values over democratic principles. As political Islam 
might also relate to a more general Islamist view, which generally includes 
the idea that men and women have distinctly different roles in society, a 
negative effect on the support for gender equality is expected. 
 
Neo-Colonialism and Anti-Western Feelings 
 
Neo-colonialism is often defined as the indirect rule of a country through 
(the threat of) military intervention and (international) economic policies by 
Géneros – Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies, 3(2)  433 
 
 
previous (Western) colonial powers (e.g. Charney, 1987; Watts, 2009: 360; 
Welch, 2008: 258). These direct military interventions are generally not 
presented as being ‘neo-colonial’, but as bringing freedom and prosperity - 
illustrated by ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ starting March 20th, 2003 - or as 
fighting Islamic fundamentalism - the ‘War on Terrorism’. The West 
presents itself as the protector and bringer of democracy and gender equality 
(see also Watts, 2009). These manifestations of neo-colonialism should be 
seen in the larger context of Western cultural-economic imperialism, which 
is signified by the penetration of the Middle Eastern public sphere by 
Western media, Hollywood, McDonalds, IMF policies, and more. In that 
context, Arab opposition to the foreign military invasion easily spreads to 
practices, products, ideas, and values that are seen as Western. 
Consequently, (‘Western’) gender equality and democracy become 
discredited and religious identities might become more salient, as suggested 
by the concept of ‘othering’ (e.g. De Beauvoir, 1978; Decety & 
Summerville, 2003; Said, 1978; Zuhur, 1992).  
 In essence, ‘othering’ was already described in Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations: “As people define their identity … they are likely to see an 
“us” versus “them” … efforts of the West to promote its values of 
democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military 
predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering 
responses from other civilizations … [in which] groups will increasingly 
attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and 
civilization identity.” (1993: 29) In other words, neo-colonialism feeds the 
creation of an ‘us’ and ‘them’, revolving around religion, democracy and 
gender equality. In that process, the dominant group is said to determine 
which characteristics they stress (Said, 1978). To empower itself, ‘the other’ 
can be expected to take over, reinforce, and reappropriate the identity 
enforced upon it by the dominant power. So if the West sketches the 
difference by depicting itself as gender equality, democratic and secular or 
Christian, the opposites - gender hierarchy, autocracy or Islamic rule, and 
Islam - become strong potential ‘positive’ characteristics for the anti-
Western opposition in the Middle East. Moreover, local organisations that 
strive for democracy and gender equality might become discredited, being 
labelled as ‘Western allies’.  
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 While the theoretical mechanism has been formulated in its most extreme 
form above, it is not hard to recognize how these opposite identities are 
stressed in the West’s political rhetoric as well as in the positions of 
(Islamist) leaders in the Middle East and society at large (see Angrist, 2012; 
Barber, 1996; Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Moghadam, 2003a; Walby, 
2011). The impact of this is shown in Angrist’s comparison among Muslim 
countries, whereby women’s weaker economic position in the Arab ones is 
partly explained by new imperialism shaping both ethnic-religious and 
gender equality inequalities simultaneously.  
 If the mechanism also works at the individual level, the stances on gender 
equality, democracy and religion are partly a function of anti-Western 
feelings, instead of being linked (completely) causally. In this light, Rizzo, 
Abdel-Latif & Meyer’s (2007: 1165) show that Middle Eastern Arab people 
who see the Western cultural invasion as a threat more seem less supportive 
of gender equality. They are more supportive of democracy, but this is again 
attributed to instrumentalism: democracy is seen suggested to be a means to 
fight a growing Western influence and the spread of feminist ideas. Moaddel 
(2006: 101) draws similar conclusions for Saudi Arabia, but his 
operationalization of variables is unclear, which might actually lead to 
opposite conclusions.  
 This study will be the first to explore to what extent anti-Western feelings 
is one of the many factors that relate and possibly influence the other 
relationships in the triangular model. I expect that anti-Western feelings 
relate negatively to the support for gender equality and democracy and 
positively an Islamic-religious identity. Moreover, the possible link between 
the last and first two, whereby Islamic-religious beliefs might be one of the 
factors that explains people’s gender equality attitudes and democratic 
support is expected to weaken after taking anti-Western feelings into account 
(see Figure 2). A next step in studying the role of anti-Western feelings 
would be to test the direction of causality. Results supporting my 
expectations can also indicate reversed causality: Islamic identities being 
one of the causes of anti-Western feelings. 
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Figure 2 
 
The possible role of anti-Western feelings in shaping the triangular 
relationship between Islam, democracy and gender equality 
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Methods & Data 
 
Models & Data 
 
OLS regression models are applied, controlling for demographic and socio-
economic inequalities (age, sex, education, employment) as well as 
differences between the countries. First, gender equality attitudes will serve 
as dependent variable, with Islamic orientations as core predictors. 
Subsequently, the support for democracy is modelled, with Islamic 
orientation and gender equality attitudes as core independent variables. This 
shows the role of gender equality in linking religion to democracy. For the 
exploratory part, I include anti-Western feelings. The analyses rely on the 
Arab Barometer data for Algeria (1,300 respondents), Jordan (1,143), 
Kuwait (750), Lebanon (1,200), Morocco (1,277), Palestine (1,270), and 
Yemen (1,182), collected in 2006 or later. To assure comparability, all 
analyses only use the respondents who have no missing data on any of the 
variables, leading to models with 4,774 respondents
2
. The WVS data are 
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available for fewer countries include fewer questions on anti-Western 
feelings and Islamism. 
 
Variables of Interest 
 
Descriptive information can be found in Table 1. To measure democratic 
support three items were available: (1) Democracy may have its problems 
but is better than any other form of government [1 ‘Strongly agree’ to 4 
‘Strongly disagree’]; (2) Democracy is suitable for [Country Name]? [0 
‘Completely unsuitable’ to 10 ‘Completely suitable’]; (3): What do you 
think about a democratic political system (public freedom, equal political 
and civil rights, balance of power) as a way of governing [Country Name]? 
[1 ‘Very good’ to 4 ‘Very bad’]. A principal-axis factor analysis shows that 
these items tap into one underlying factor
3
. Each variable was transformed to 
scale with a minimum of 0 and 3 as maximum (the higher, the more 
democratic), and their mean is used.  
 On people’s attitude towards gender equality seven items were used in a 
principal-axis factor analysis: one or two underlying concepts could be 
distinguished
4
. To obtain more details, I constructed two indices. Three 
items cluster around women’s place in the public sphere: Do you agree with: 
(1) A woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country; (2) 
Men make better political leaders than women do; (3) University education 
is more important for a boy than a girl. Three others focus on economic 
gender equality: Do you agree with: (1) A married woman can work outside 
the home if she wishes; (2) Men and women should have equal job 
opportunities and wages; (3) Men and women should receive equal wages 
and salaries. All (four-point) items range from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’. For both indices the mean of the three items is taken; a higher 
score (0-3) indicates more gender equal attitudes.  
 I distinguish between three aspects of Islamic-religious identity: 
affiliation, religiosity-piety, and political Islamism. First, affiliation has three 
categories [‘Muslim’, ‘Christian’, ‘other/unknown’]. Next, a factor analysis 
on 14 items was used to select the items for constructing the piety and 
political Islamism indices
5
. Two items seem to measure the strength and 
depth of people’s religion (piety) best: How important (1) praying and (2) 
Géneros – Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies, 3(2)  437 
 
 
fasting was for being a suitable spouse for a respondent’s daughter or son 
[‘very’, ‘somewhat’, ‘not important’]6. The (inversed) average created a 0-3 
scale, a higher score equalling more piety. The respondents’ political 
Islamist views were measured by three items: whether (1) a parliamentary 
system with only Islamic parties or (2) a system governed by Islamic law 
without political parties is suitable for the country [‘very suitable’ to ‘not 
suitable at all’], and whether only laws of the Shari’a should be 
implemented [‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’]. Taking the (inversed) 
average of the four-point items led to a 0-3 scale, the higher the more 
Islamic. Data on political Islam was missing for Moroccan respondents, 
which are replaced by the average of all other respondents and a country 
dummy is included (see Allison, 2001).  
 The more explorative analyses focus on the broad concept of Western 
cultural imperialism and the consequent rather general anti-Western feelings. 
The three suitable items in the Arab Barometer all load on one factor
7
: 
Despite negative US foreign policies, most ordinary Americans are good 
people [‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’]; The culture of the US and other Western 
countries has many positive attributes [‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’]; Exposure to the 
culture of the US and other Western countries has a harmful effect on 
[Country Name] [‘Strongly agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Strongly disagree’]. 
The first item only refers to the U.S., but as all three load on one factor, it 
can be expected that the construct used here taps into general anti-Western 
feelings reasonably well. A 0-3 scale was created by dichotomizing the last 
item, inversing the second, and then adding the three up. A higher score 
indicates stronger anti-Western sentiments. For Yemen only one item is 
available. Again, Yemeni respondents are given the average score on the 
index for all other respondents and a country dummy is included (see 
Allison, 2001). Alternatively, using one item does not lead to substantially 
different conclusions. 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Support for democracy 0 3 2.23 0.57 
Support for economic gender 
equality 
0 3 2.13 0.66 
Support for women’s public role 0 3 1.34 0.79 
Denomination: Muslim 0 1 0.51 0.50 
Denomination: Christian 0 1 0.10 0.30 
Denomination: Other 0 1 0.39 0.49 
Religious piety 0 3 2.08 1.09 
Support for political Islam 0 3 1.15 0.76 
Anti-Western feelings 0 3 1.01 0.82 
Age in 7 groups 0 6 1.71 1.39 
Sex (1= female) 0 1 0.45 0.50 
Education in 7 groups 0 6 2.80 1.69 
Employment status (1=employed) 0 1 0.50 0.50 
 
Control Variables  
 
The models are controlled for the usual socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics (e.g. Meyer, Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; Rizzo, 
Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007; Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005). For age a 
seven-point scale was available. All respondents are 18 years old and over. 
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Sex was included as a dummy variable (1=female). Education was provided 
as a seven-category variable
8
. A dummy for employment status was included 
(1=employed), and country dummies capture other political, cultural, and 
economic differences between the countries and their systems 
 
Analyses 
 
Testing the Micro-Level Triangle  
 
Models 1 and 3 (Table 2) show that the results are rather similar for 
supporting economic gender equality and women’s position in the public 
sphere. First, on average Christian people support gender equality 
substantially more than Muslim inhabitants, and the others fall in-between 
Muslim and Christian people. Second, more pious people are generally less 
supportive of gender equality. Third, the same holds for respondents who 
hold more political Islamist views. These effects are about twice as strong 
for the attitudes towards the public role of women than for economic gender 
equality. Moreover, the impact of religious piety is about half of political 
Islam. Generally, despite the existence of feminist interpretation of Islam, it 
seems that more religiously Islamic people are on average less supportive of 
gender equality. Moreover, while the different dimensions of religious 
identity have independent effects, they show less differentiation than 
expected. 
 Model 5 shows what influences people’s attitudes towards democracy, 
which is roughly in line with expectations. No average difference is found 
between Christian and Muslim people
9
, and more pious people do not seem 
to be less supportive of democracy. The only religious attitude that relates to 
people attitudes towards democracy is political Islamism. Citizens that 
believe that Islam should be strongly intertwined with the political system 
are on average less supportive of democracy. Religious restrictions on who 
may lead a country and whether religious laws should form the boundaries 
of decision-making by the people are at odds with democracy 
fundamentally, as also discussed and shown in other country-level studies on 
the Middle East and Europe (Anderson, Seibert & Wagner, 2012: 147-8; 
Klausen, 2007: 160; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). The same reasoning 
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can be expected to hold for Christianity and other religions: if they are 
considered to inform the boundaries of decision-making they limit 
democratic politics. Moreover, this result does not indicate that Islamic 
parties cannot function within democratic systems, as has already been seen 
in most recently in for instance Tunisia and Egypt, and more generally in 
Indonesia, Nigeria, and many other Muslim Majority countries (Esposito & 
Voll, 1996; Owen 2003; Spierings, 2012). My results only show that people 
who believe that the political system should be more Islamic are on average 
less supportive of democracy.  
 Political Islamism’s negative impact on democracy is considerably 
smaller than what was found for gender equality. This is partly due to its 
intervening effect through gender equality though. Especially people’s 
stance towards economic gender equality has an overall positive impact on 
democratic support – and as we shall see below where a longitudinal 
perspective is taken, the support for gender equality has slightly risen 
recently, at least in Iraq –, and these gender equality attitudes were 
negatively influenced by political Islamist attitudes (see Model 1). Without 
the intervening gender equality variable in the model, the impact of political 
Islam would have been stronger by roughly one fifth. The total effect of 
political Islamism thus remains modest. No indirect influence of political 
Islamist attitudes through the other gender equality variable was found. 
Additional models do not indicate substantive indirect effects of piety and 
denomination. 
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Table 2 
Regression models on the support for democratic and gender equality 
attitudes 
 
 Model 1:  
Economic 
gender 
equality 
Model 2: 
Economic 
gender 
equality 
& anti- 
Western 
feelings 
Model 3:  
Public 
role 
women 
Model 4:  
Public 
presence 
women & 
anti-
Western 
feelings 
Model 5: 
Demo- 
cracy 
Model 6: 
Democra- 
cy & anti-
Western 
feelings 
Denomination (Ref. = 
Muslim)  
      
   Christian 0.423*** 
(0.040) 
0.406*** 
(0.040) 
0.511*** 
(0.043) 
0.503*** 
(0.044) 
0.047 
(0.035) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
   Other 0.320*** 
(0.078) 
0.355*** 
(0.078) 
0.289** 
(0.085) 
0.305*** 
(0.085) 
-0.550*** 
(0.067) 
-0.512*** 
(0.066) 
Religious piety -0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
-0.119*** 
(0.011) 
-0.117*** 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
Support for political Islam -0.107*** 
(0.015) 
-0.097*** 
(0.015) 
-0.200*** 
(0.016) 
-0.195*** 
(0.016) 
-0.051*** 
(0.013) 
-0.042** 
(0.013) 
Support for economic 
gender equality 
- - - - 0.111*** 
(0.013) 
0.104*** 
(0.013) 
Support for women’s public 
role 
- - - - -0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
Anti-Western feelings - -0.065*** 
(0.011) 
- -0.031* 
(0.013) 
- -0.066*** 
(0.010) 
Age in 7 groups 0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
Sex (1= female) 0.330*** 
(0.019) 
0.331*** 
(0.018) 
0.374*** 
(0.020) 
0.375*** 
(0.020) 
-0.049** 
(0.016) 
-0.046** 
(0.016) 
Education in 7 groups 0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
       
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
 
      
 Model 1:  
Economic 
gender 
equality 
Model 2: 
Economic 
gender 
equality 
& anti- 
Western 
feelings 
Model 3:  
Public 
role 
women 
Model 4:  
Public 
presence 
women & 
anti-
Western 
feelings 
Model 5: 
Demo- 
cracy 
Model 6: 
Democra- 
cy & anti-
Western 
feelings 
Denomination (Ref. = Muslim) 
Employment status 
(1=employed) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
Constant 1.658*** 
(0.098) 
1.675*** 
(0.098) 
1.025*** 
(0.106) 
1.033*** 
(0.106) 
2.343*** 
(0.086) 
2.371*** 
(0.086) 
R square 0.169 0.175 0.312 0.313 0.184 0.191 
n 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 
* <0.05, ** <0.01, *** <0.001; The standard errors are given between brackets. All models are fixed effects 
models including dummies for the countries. The coefficient are not shown here but can be obtained from the 
author. Source: Arab Barometer data 
A Square Triangle?  
 
Models 2, 4 and 6 show that people who hold more anti-Western feelings are 
on average somewhat less supportive of gender equality and democracy, 
taking into account economic position, age and sex. From this it cannot be 
concluded that democracy and gender equality are Western concepts per se 
or that all people who are critical of the West are anti-democracy and pro-
gender inequality. However, it does translate findings from studies on 
Middle Eastern society to the popular level though. Comparative case 
studies have shown that gender equality and democracy are regularly seen as 
foreign, Western concepts - or claimed to be by religious leaders (e.g. 
Esposito & Voll, 1996; Moghadam, 2003b:Ch5). Evidently, the alternative 
interpretations of Islam found among social movements are also found 
among the population; nevertheless, on average, the people that associate 
anti-Westernism with opposition to democracy and gender equality 
outnumbers the citizens who are anti-Western and supportive of democracy 
and gender equality. A more fine-grained analysis of the data shows that the 
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mains difference is found between the quarter of people that hardly have any 
anti-Western feelings and the three-quarters of people that is somewhat to 
strongly anti-Western.  
 Comparing Models 1, 3 and 5 to Models 2, 4 and 6 respectively show 
how the inclusion of anti-Western feelings changes the relationship between 
Islamic orientations and gender equality or democracy (summarized in Table 
3). The impact of religious attitudes does not show clear differences across 
the board, but where a substantial impact is found, it is a weakening of the 
impact of Islam
10
. For the women’s public role variable are close to absent, 
and the two strongest effects (>30% decreases) are found for originally 
statistically insignificant relationships. Basically, only the declining effects 
of political Islamism on democratic support (-18%) and economic gender 
equality (-9%), and of religious piety on economic gender equality (-10%) 
follow the theoretical reasoning. Since political Islamist attitudes were 
among the most important explanatory variables of gender equality and 
democracy, these decreases should not be neglected though.  
 In sum, the analyses indicate that anti-Western feelings are related to all 
three angles of the triangle and influence the relationships among them 
modestly. Not including them might thus lead to slightly biased results; the 
triangle seems to have another corner. These analyses, however, do not tell 
whether the found effects are caused via an ‘othering effect’ or whether 
people who hold more conservative Islamic opinions are more anti-Western 
and therefore less supportive of democracy and gender equality. 
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Table 3 
 
Change in coefficients after inclusion of anti-Western feelings 
 
 Economic 
gender 
equality  
Public role 
women 
Democracy 
Denomination (Ref. = Muslim)     
   Christian - 4% - 2% (ns) - 30%  
   Other + 11% + 6% - 7% 
Religious piety - 10% - 2% (ns) - 36%  
Support for political Islam - 9% - 3% - 18% 
Support for economic gender equality - - - 6% 
Support for women’s public role - - (ns) 0 %  
A strengthening effect is given a (+) a weakening effect a (-), and (ns) indicates that the 
variable had no significant effect in itself on the dependent variable. Based on Table 2.  
 
A Neo-Colonial Intervention: Can We Shed More Light on the Causal 
Direction?  
 
To get a better grip on that causal direction, an experimental template is 
needed in which anti-Western feelings are increased exogenously to see how 
that affects the other variables. Practically, such an experiment is infeasible 
(and ethically condemnable). However, the two Iraqi WVS surveys in 
combination with the neo-colonial treatment – in experimental terms – 
through the 2003 Western military intervention and the Second Gulf War in 
Iraq might help us to get closer at the causal direction. It can serve as a 
pseudo experiment, because this invasion was exogenous to developments in 
the popular attitudes in Iraq, and because the support for the attacks was low 
in the Arab region (e.g. Andersen, Seibert & Wagner, 2012: 359-365; Owen, 
2004: 221). It is thus reasonable to expect that a rise in anti-Western feelings 
- if any - is partly due to the ‘treatment’ with neo-colonialism. Ideally, 
before- and after-treatment surveys would have been available; 
unfortunately, the first was collected in 2004, shortly after the start of the 
intervention. The second survey was conducted in 2006. Nevertheless, the 
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U.S.-led troops were strongly present in Iraq during this entire period, and 
thus the ‘neo-colonial dose’ - again in terms of experimental methodology - 
had doubled in 2006. For the ‘othering effect’ to be supported the anti-
Western feelings should have risen, the support for democracy declined, and 
political Islamist attitudes increased (see Table 4)
 11
.  
 It seems that the Iraqi people did indeed become more adverse to the 
West, and given the strong anti-Western feelings in 2004, the additional 4.1 
percentage points is rather substantial
12
. This shift is accompanied by an 
overall decline in considering democracy a good system of 3.8 percentage 
points
13
. In addition, other authors focusing on the most extremist anti-
Western groups – Jihadists, who work from a fundamentalist Islamic 
interpretation of scripture and use militaristic violence to spread Islam and 
fight the West - found that the activities of these particular jihadist groups 
have become a growing phenomenon lately and consequently a growing 
threat to democracy (Khosrokhavar, 2009), which suggests a similar pattern 
at the social movement level. (Evidently, at the same time progressive and 
democratic Muslim movements could have become stronger, but this is less 
reflected in the public opinion in Iraq.) In her description of the events in the 
region, also Angrist’s (2012: 61-3) suggests that the economic-cultural 
Western penetration of the region after the oil shocks of the 1970s and 
through economic liberalization goes hand-in-hand with Western cultural 
influences in terms of gender equality, which were promoted by the Western 
economic and political organizations in the region. These processes, Angrist 
claims, increased grievances, a politics of identity, and resistance to the 
adoption and standardization of norms perceived as Western (see also 
Barber, 1996; Moghadam, 2003a).  
 However, while I did find rising anti-Western attitudes, I did not find an 
unambiguous increase in political Islamist attitudes among the ordinary 
people: on two indicators support for political Islam increased, and on two it 
decreased. This ambiguity tends to reflect the historical experiences in Iran: 
the 1979 revolution was clearly anti-Western but not clearly Islamist, 
contrary to what is often thought. Seculars and pro-women’s groups were 
amongst the most present protesters, and only during a power vacuum after 
the overthrow of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Islamists took power (and 
discriminatory laws against women were enacted) (e.g. Ebadi, 2012; 
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Ghorashi, 1996). Overall, there is some support for the ‘othering thesis’ in 
terms of democratic identities, and it cannot simply be refuted or ignored, 
but the evidence is certainly not conclusive. 
 Given that the anti-Western feelings did not really affect the impact of 
Islam on gender equality, changes on these are less relevant to the ‘othering 
effect’. Moreover, across the board gender hierarchy is on average supported 
less (which says little about the legal and social position of women or the 
strength of the organized opposition to further developments towards gender 
equality). This provides further support for the conclusion that ‘othering’ 
does not play a role in shaping a relationship between Islamic and gender 
equality attitudes. 
 
Table 4 
Gender equality, democracy, and Islamic orientations in Iraq 
 
 Iraq 
2004 
Iraq 
2006 
change 
Anti-Western feelings    
The cultural invasion by the West is (a 
threat/a serious threat) 
92.0% 96.1% ↑ 
Democracy    
Having a democratic political system is 
(very good) 
58.6% 54.8% ↓ 
Political Islam    
Politicians who don’t believe in god 
are unfit for office (agree strongly) 
70.7% 74.3% ↑ 
Religious leaders should not influence 
how people vote (strongly 
disagree/disagree) 
22.6% 24.2% ↑ 
Better if more people with strong 
religious beliefs in public office (agree 
strongly/agree) 
63.7% 51.7% ↓ 
Only laws of the Shari’a (agree 
strongly/agree) 
54.6% 48.1% ↓ 
(Continued) 
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(Continued) 
    
 Iraq 
2004 
Iraq 
2006 
change 
Gender (in)equality    
Men make better political leaders than 
women do (agree strongly) 
70.9% 69.0% ↓ 
University is more important for a boy 
than for a girl (strongly agree) 
28.8% 24.8% ↓ 
Wife must obey (agree strongly) 63.6% 63.2% ↓ 
Source: WVS 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ousting of Mubarak in Egypt (2011) and Ben Ali in Tunisia (2011), 
political reforms in Morocco (2011), and civil wars in Libya (2011) and 
Syria (2013) have shown the possible impact popular opinion can have in 
the Arab Middle East. While popular opinion is no guarantee for change, and 
change can go in multiple directions, for instance regarding the position of 
women, these events underscore that popular attitudes can ignite 
democratization processes and women’s emancipation. This asks for a good 
understanding of people’s attitudes towards gender equality and democracy, 
and what influences those. Regarding those influences the current literature 
on the Arab Middle East often points to Islam as a (negative) force (e.g. 
Barro, 1999; Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002; Hofman, 2004; 
Huntington, 1993; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; 
Meyer, Rizzo & Ali, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & 
Meyer, 2007; Ross, 2001; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Tessler, 2002; 
Tessler & Gao, 2005); however, at the mass level, the study of linkages 
between Islam, democracy and gender equality shows important lacunae. 
This study has addressed some of those.  
 First of all, this study provided the first multicountry micro-level test of 
the triangular relationship, whereby the it is generally expected that people 
with on average more Islamic-religious orientations have a less positive 
stance towards gender equality and democracy, and the relationship 
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between Islam and democracy partly works through gender equality 
attitudes. Regarding, gender equality, it was indeed found that on average 
different expression of Islam (affiliation, piety, and Islamism) relate to 
gender equality attitudes negatively, which supports and refines results 
from less encompassing studies (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b; 
Moaddel, 2006; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Rizzo, Meyer & Ali, 2002). 
Despite strong political organisations pro-democracy and gender equality in 
the Middle East, people with strong political Islamic views also show a 
modestly lower support for democracy on average, and this works partly 
through (lower) support for economic gender equality. Affiliation and piety, 
however, do not seem to have a strong impact on democratic support. 
Overall, the analyses support the triangular model and go against results 
from studies that found that people who are in favour of more gender 
equality are generally less supportive of democracy (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & 
Meyer, 2007). More generally, the results are more supportive of culturalist 
explanations linking conservative Islam to gender hierarchy and less 
support for democracy, than with instrumentalist theories (Jamal & Tessler, 
2008; Moaddel, 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007) that argue that 
people’s support for democracy and gender equality mostly depends on 
whether it serves their interests. Moreover, even if positive relationships 
between Islamism and gender equality or democratic support had been 
found, instrumentalism was not the only explanation. The prevalence of 
feminist and democratic interpretation of the Qu’ran and Hadith among 
people could also explain such relationships, but these are often ignored in 
the micro-level studies. In sum, more study in the exact mechanisms is 
necessary, as theories often build on very broad collections of stereotypes 
or scriptural arguments about Islam, and it is not yet clear which elements 
of Islam are actually at the core of most people’s stances on gender equality 
and democracy. 
 Secondly, this study disentangled different dimensions of Islamic-
religious orientations and tested their impact simultaneously for a substantial 
number of Arab countries. Contrary to my expectations, Islamic 
denomination, piety and political Islam all had independent negative effects 
on gender equality attitudes. However, for democratic support rather 
different relationships were found and this partly explains the variety of 
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conclusions in the current literature (see Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Meyer, 
Rizzo & Ali, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Rizzo, Abdel-
Latif & Meyer, 2007; Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005). In sum, only 
more political Islamist people supported democracy less, which is not 
surprising as political Islamism measures to what extent people think politics 
should be curtailed by religion. This effect partly worked through gender 
equality attitudes, supporting Fish’s (2002) macro-level theory of why 
dominant religious cultures might lead to more the presence of more 
autocratic regimes in the Middle East.  
 Not only Islamic orientations, but also support for gender equality 
includes multiple dimensions. The impact of Islam was stronger for 
women’s position in politics and education than it was on economic gender 
equality, but only the latter influenced democratic support and linked Islam 
to democracy. These results suggest that the research of gender equality 
attitudes should theorize the different dimension of people’s opinion 
towards gender equality more systematically, as they can have quite 
different causes and consequences. 
 The third contribution of this study was more explorative. While Esposito 
& Mogahed (2007:151) point out that: “Muslim responses need to be 
understood within the context of a world in which many Muslims feel under 
siege”, only a few studies on Arab people’s attitudes have looked at the 
stance towards the Western cultural invasion and none of these assessed how 
these sentiments might influence the links between Islam, gender equality 
and democracy (see Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Moaddel, 2006; Rizzo, 
Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007). Based on the concept of ‘othering’ (De 
Beauvoir, 1978; Decety & Summerville, 2003; Said, 1978; Zuhur, 1992), I 
expected that - in the context of neo-colonialism and political rhetoric 
linking the West to gender equality and democracy, and the Middle East to 
Islam, misogyny and autocracy - anti-Western feelings might lead people to 
simultaneously become more Islamic and less supportive of democracy and 
gender equality. The analyses do not support this mechanism for gender 
equality: while more anti-Western people were less in favour of gender 
equality, the anti-Western feelings did not account for the impact of Islam. 
However, the results indicated that ‘othering’ might link democratic support 
and political Islamism. This study cannot produce conclusive results, but the 
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outcomes legitimize more research on the causal direction of the links 
between anti-Western feelings and Islamist attitudes. More generally, anti-
Western feelings were shown to relate to all corners of the Islam-democracy-
gender equality triangle. In line with Esposito & Mogahed’s advice, this 
study shows that not taking anti-Western feelings into account when 
studying attitudes towards Islam, democracy and gender equality in the Arab 
Middle East can lead to biased results.  
 The results of this micro-level study also feed back into the comparative 
country-level studies: (1) the modest indirect influence of political Islam on 
democracy through gender equality lends more supports for Fish’s (2002) 
claims that women’s empowerment is the macro-level missing link between 
Islam and autocracy, than Donno & Russett’s (2004) contestation of that, (2) 
it suggests that macro-level studies on gender equality and democracy 
should make distinctions in the form in which Islam manifests itself (see 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Spierings, 2014), and (3) that anti-
Westernism and neo-colonial politics should be included in the analyses 
explaining political systems and gender equality policies (see Angrist, 2012).  
 Among the Arab public both this study and recent events have shown 
considerably support for change towards democracy and gender equality. 
However, in particular, political Islam and anti-Westernism seem to 
decrease people’s enthusiasm about democracy and gender equality. Add to 
that that political Islamist movements often fight economic inequalities (El-
Ghobashy, 2005; Esposito & Voll 1996; Owen 2004) the current 
confrontational politics of the West might not be the best strategy to foster 
democracy and women’s freedom in the Middle East. This study suggests 
that the support for long-existing local women’s movements and fighting 
poverty might be much more efficient as they present local alternative 
interpretation of Islam to legitimize change. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Some studies on women’s actual position show otherwise. Both Read (2004) for Muslim 
women in the U.S. and Spierings (2012) for women in several Muslim countries show that 
Muslim women are for instance not less of even more often gainfully employed than non-
Muslim women.  
2 Algeria: 460; Jordan: 683; Kuwait: 412; Lebanon: 899; Morocco: 916; Palestine: 1,012; 
Yemen: 392.  
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3 Results can be obtained from the author.  
4 ibid  
5 ibid  
6 ‘Reading the Quran’ would be an alternative measurement, but that is strongly related to 
literacy, making it unsuitable here.  
7 Ibid footnote 3.  
8 Illiterate, Elementary, Primary, Secondary, College Diploma- two years, BA, MA or higher.  
9 The ‘other’ group is less supportive of democratic institutions. These respondents are almost 
exclusively Druze from Lebanon, making this result likely to be idiosyncratic.  
10 The exception is for the position of the Druze in Lebanon (‘Other’). They mainly live in 
the Shuf hills above Beirut, the area the Israelis invaded in 1982 and which was hit by U.S. 
missiles (Friedman, 1989; Harris, 2011). This might explain relatively strong anti-Western 
feelings. 
11 Given the short time period and continuing Second Gulf War, no big changes due to 
Modernization are expected (see Inglehart & Norris, 2003b).  
12 T-test: p<0.001.  
13 T-test: p<0.05. 
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